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Introduction
Concerns about youth behaviour are by no means new (Pearson 1983). Over recent decades,
however, they have prompted intense political debate and policy reform, heralding the
introduction of an array of measures to tackle low-level behavioural problems and prevent
their escalation. Whilst analogous developments have found expression in various European
andWestern societies (Beckett and Herbert 2010; and this special issue), nowhere has this been
more evident than in the UK—England in particular. For many the symbol of conservative and
stable legal institutions, England over the past two decades has been at the forefront of
regulatory innovations of a kind almost unique in its legal and constitutional history (Moran
2003). Novel regulatory tools have been fashioned that include, inter alia, anti-social behav-
iour orders (ASBOs), housing injunctions, acceptable behaviour contracts (ABCs), parenting
orders, parenting contracts, tenancy demotion orders, family intervention programmes, and so
forth.1 These coalesce around the term anti-social behaviour (ASB) conceived as a precursor to
more serious crime—a type of pre-crime (Zedner 2007)—and an indicator of future criminal-
ity. As an umbrella concept, ASB has come to demarcate a distinct policy field that blurs
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traditional distinctions between crime and disorder (Crawford 2009a: 814). In many ways, the
new hybrid tools represent a direct challenge to, and in some cases an assault upon, traditional
conceptions of criminal justice. They frequently undermine established legal principles of due
process, proportionality and special protections afforded to young people. Above all else, the
panoply of new laws, powers and technologies that have been spawned are targeted at, and
concerned with, the question of governing troublesome youth (Crawford 2009a).
From the outset, the new powers raised questions about their legitimacy and effectiveness.
Legitimacy, as Weber (1978) noted, constitutes important moral glue that informs people’s
motivational systems and guides their behaviour. Legitimacy speaks to, and derives from,
intrinsic motivations that foster self-regulation and encourage the internalisation of social
norms and values. Following Beetham (1991: 16), legitimacy may be understood as the extent
to which powers conform to established rules; the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs
shared by both dominant and subordinate groups; and there is evidence of consent by the
subordinate to the particular power relations. In relation to the first, there have been significant
debates about the extent to which specific new powers may contravene established legal rules,
most notably human rights protections via the European Convention on Human Rights
(Bakalis 2007; Cosgrove and Cosgrove 2011). This paper, by contrast, explores the legitimacy
of the hybrid powers from the perspective of those subordinate groups who are subject to
them. It provides an overview and analysis of the introduction and implementation of various
regulatory tools to regulate ASB, drawing on an empirical study conducted between 2008 and
2012, in England. Whilst there have been recent changes to the armoury of powers introduced
during this period, via the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, much of this
has been superficial rather than a wholesale change. Moreover, as we shall see, many of the
most important innovations occurred without any legislative footing and have remained
unaffected by recent modifications. What follows explores the role of procedural justice and
legitimacy in the use of interventions with young people. To situate the research findings in a
broader context, we begin with an overview and analysis of the politics that informed the
regulatory innovations and their implementation.
Regulatory Hyperactivity
Whilst the term anti-social behaviour first appeared in housing legislation, in 1996, before the
election of the first Blair government (a year later), the ASB agenda became a key cornerstone
of the Labour government’s approach to public policy (Crawford 2008). At the symbolic heart
of this regulatory revolution was the ASBO. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (s. 1) gave
police and local authorities powers to apply to the Magistrates’ Court for an ASBO on the
grounds that the person acted in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm
or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as the accused and that such an
order is necessary to protect relevant persons from further anti-social acts. The penalty for
breach of an ASBO enabled imposition of a custodial sentence of imprisonment for up to
5 years. Subsequently, the Police Reform Act 2002 (s. 64) introduced a post-conviction version
of the ASBO—colloquially known as the Criminal Anti-Social Behaviour Order, or
CRASBO—that could be imposed in addition to a criminal sentence if there was evidence
of past ASB. Within 2 years there were nearly double the number of CRASBOs by application
as there were ASBOs. This little remarked transformation in the use of ASBOs (Burney 2009)
was one of the most significant developments, reinforcing the argument that as a technology of
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control, ASBOs herald novel ways of regulating behaviour for which criminal responses were
already available but deemed ineffective in themselves.
Since its introduction in 1999, the ASBO came to dominate public debate about interven-
tions with young people to address behavioural problems. Up to the end of 2013, some 24,427
ASBOs were issued, of which 8710 (or 36 %) were issued against young people aged between
10 and 18 years (Ministry of Justice 2014). Of these, <2 % (153) were granted against 10 and
11-year-olds, a further 23 % (2026) against 12 to 14-year-olds and the remaining 75 % (6531)
against those ≥15 and <18 (see Fig. 1). Most ASBOs were issued on conviction (CRASBO)
for a criminal offence (60 %; 14,776) rather than as preventative stand-alone civil orders. In
2013, 65 % of ASBOs were issued following conviction for a criminal offence. Slightly more
than two thirds of juveniles had breached their ASBOs at least once by the end of 2013,
compared with slightly more than half of adults.
ASBOs, like a number of other hybrid orders used to regulate behaviour and low-level
incivilities, present acute legitimacy challenges and embody mixed assumptions about behav-
ioural motivation and agency, with significant implications for compliance, especially for
young people (Crawford 2009b). They do so not only because they straddle and blur
distinctions between criminal and civil legal processes and fuse informal and formal interven-
tions, but also because they constitute a cluster of civil preventative orders, prohibitions and
conditional support interventions whereby noncompliance (breach) is rendered an offence and
thus punishable. Failure to fulfil the terms of an initial order, contract or agreement provides
the grounds for subsequent criminalisation. Hence, they constitute civil orders backed up by
criminal penalties, whereby it is future conduct that becomes the focus of prospective
regulation. The criminal act arises as a result of failure to abide by the conditions set in the
order rather than the initial conduct itself. Significantly, the behaviour that breaches the
conditions or agreed terms may under all other circumstances constitute permissible legal
activities.2 These hybrid orders introduce a distinct dimension of conditionality into the
legality of future conduct for those subject to them. In the process, principles of proportionality
no longer determine the relationship between past acts and future constraints. Hence, through
hybridisation notions of intention and motivation become confused, and new variations of
liability are formed (Ashworth 2004: 265). At the same time, hybridisation facilitates evasion
of erstwhile safeguards and established due process, both of which are deemed to get in the
way of effective regulation.
The early years, 1997–2003, constituted a period in which new legal powers and practices
were initiated through legislative reforms and policy hyperinnovation. In addition to the intro-
duction of the ASBO and CRASBO, this included an array of nonstatutory innovations, such as
the use of formal warnings and ABCs. The latter—also known in some parts of the country as
acceptable behaviour agreements (or ABAs)—are a written agreement between an individual and
local authority and/or police consisting of a list of anti-social acts fromwhich the person agrees to
desist. Theymay also include positive conditions byway of support services to be accessed by the
individual. The use of ABCs largely emerged through local initiative in the late 1990s, rather than
being centrally driven. They subsequently received formal government recognition and promo-
tion (Home Office 2003) and were the subject of an early Home Office evaluation (Bullock and
2 Although their basic legal structure is similar both to the longstanding application that a person be bound over
to keep the peace, and to applications under various provisions relating to health and safety at work that
originated in the nineteenth century, the immediate roots of the new civil preventive orders lie in legislative
developments in the 1990s. The most closely related legal instrument in form is the Statutory Nuisance
Abatement Notice, s.79 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (see Jenkins 2015).
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Jones 2004). Importantly, whilst ABCs are not legally binding, they can be used in court as
evidence in an ASBO application or in eviction proceedings (Crawford 2003).
From 2004 to 2006 the focus shifted significantly to the challenges of policy delivery
whereby the goal of irreversible change that citizens might notice and appreciate became a
major policy driver. The Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (first established in 2001) set the
template for the relentless pursuit of policy implementation; what the head of the unit, Sir
Michael Barber (2007: 79), described as Bdeliverology—the science (or pseudoscience) of
marshalling prime ministerial power to deliver significant measurable improvements in the
public services^. This found keen expression in the establishment of the Anti-Social Behaviour
Unit and then the Respect Taskforce. This zenith of the ASB agenda is reflected in the numbers
of ASBOs for both adults and juveniles that were granted by the courts in England and Wales
(see Fig. 1). Whilst few had been issued before 2003, >42 % of all ASBOs issued (up to the
end of 2013) were issued from 2004 to 2006. Of those ASBOs issued against juveniles, nearly
46 % came in the same 3-year period. Since the high-water mark of 2005, the use of ASBOs
has declined steadily. Even at their peak (4122 in 2005), the numbers never reached the levels
initially envisaged by policymakers of 5000 per year. The national decline in the use of
ASBOs, however, hides the fact that a large volume of work with young people aimed at
tackling ASB has been taking place below and before recourse to such acute, legal responses.
The well-documented limitations of ASBOs encouraged practitioners to experiment with
and develop a host of informal approaches that seek to engage young people and their parents
through a complex array of sticks, carrots and persuasion designed to induce behavioural
change. As such, ASBOs represent only the very tip of a much larger structure of proactive
ASB interventions. Given the attention accorded to the ASBO (Squires 2008), other powers
have largely evaded public scrutiny, such as the much more widely used warning notices and
ABCs (Cosgrove and Cosgrove 2011). As Fig. 2 shows, the recorded use of ABCs—during
the years in which national data were collected—far exceeded that for ASBOs. According to
Home Office surveys of local community safety partnerships during the 6 years 2003–2009,
nearly 50,000 ABCs were formally issued (the real figure is likely to be higher due to
underrecording), the vast majority being to young people. This compares with 6242 ASBOs
issued to juveniles across approximately the same period.
The piecemeal introduction of powers left little room to consider the manner in which
various orders interact, conflict or connect with the wider existing system of youth justice. Yet
in practice a complex series of tiered hierarchies of powers emerged—often depending upon
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housing tenure—in which certain powers became complementary, such that, generally, a
recognised tiered approach existed (Home Office 2003):
1. ASBO or CRASBO
2. ABC or ABA
3. Warning notice or letter
In some parts of the country, these tiers were themselves extended to a more finely grained
hierarchy—or ladder of intervention—in which different levels of warning (with or without
referral to youth inclusion or prevention services) subsequently escalated to an ABC. In some
places a second, higher-level ABC was also used, whereas in others, pre-ASBO warnings were
used. At the apex of this ASB regulatory pyramid stood the ASBO.
From 2006 onwards there was a steady waning of the central government zeal with the
arrival of Gordon Brown as prime minister and the subsequent closure of the Respect
Taskforce in late 2007. In the light of criticisms of ASBOs from the European
Commissioner on Human Rights (Gil-Robles 2005), difficulties exposed about their ineffec-
tiveness—often labelled a badge of honour in the media—and high breach rates (Solanki et al.
2006; National Audit Office 2006; Matthews et al. 2007), there ensued a period of ambiva-
lence and policy inertia. The Coalition Government elected in 2010 was committed to
reversing much of the Labour project. It set about reviewing and reforming the legislative
framework (Home Office 2011, 2012) with the introduction of the Anti-social Behaviour,
Crime and Policing Act 2014. At its heart was a commitment to abolish the ASBO and
streamline the plethora of existing ASB powers. In place of the ASBO and CRASBO, the
legislation created two new powers: the criminal behaviour order (s. 22), available on
conviction for any criminal offence and including both prohibitions and support designed to
stop future ASB; and the injunction to prevent harassment, alarm and distress (s. 1), a civil
order with a civil burden of proof.3 In essence, what transpired largely constituted a rebranding
3 Injunctions may be ordered where the court is satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, the respondent has
engaged or threatened to engage in ASB, and it considers it Bjust and convenient^ to grant the injunction to
prevent the person engaging in ASB. The definition of ASB remains unchanged; however, both injunctions and
CBOs can now include positive requirements on the individual as well as negative restrictions. As with the
CRASBO, the CBO will be a civil preventive order that can be attached to conviction, breach of which continues
to attract a criminal penalty with a maximum sentence of 5 years.
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exercise, with some elements of consolidation, rather than genuine reform. It also included
various, rather inconsistent, attempts to put victims at the heart of ASB policies (Heap 2016).
But for the name changes, however, the regulatory powers mostly remained intact.
Furthermore, the commitment to informal and out-of-court disposals for low-level incivilities,
and the use of ABCs, warnings and early intervention programmes (Allen 2011) continued
unabated.
Nuffield Study
It was against this background and given the absence of detailed research into the impact of
diverse ASB interventions on young people and the interactions between them that the
Nuffield Foundation funded a large-scale research study over a 4-year period between 2008
and 2012. This paper draws on the findings of the Nuffield research (see also Crawford et al.
2012). It focused on the use of formal ASB warning letters, ABCs and ASBOs and the
interrelations between these tools and the wider preventive and support services allied to them.
The research gathered data from, and interviewed a range of participants in, four Community
Safety Partnerships across England. These study sites comprised two large northern cities and
two London boroughs. As agreed at the outset, the sites are not named. They were selected on
the basis that they represented large Community Safety Partnerships in relatively high-crime
areas with diverse minority ethnic populations, indicators of social deprivation and significant
social housing stock. At the time the study commenced, they were also acknowledged to have
developed significant expertise in tackling ASB and in delivering coherent packages of youth
interventions. In many senses, they were seen as leaders in the field of ASB practice and
recognised as examples of good practice.
The research collected data on the use of ASB interventions with all young people given a
formal warning, ABC or ASBO between 1 April 2008 and 31 March 2010 in the four study
areas. The study sought to track their pathways back over time, and forward to the end of the
data collection period. More than 120 interviews were conducted across the fieldwork sites.
This includes interviews with 36 young people subject to an ABC and 18 parents. In addition,
interviews were held with more than 70 local ASB professionals from housing, police, the
local authority and youth offending services. This paper focuses on the qualitative findings
drawing primarily from the interviews with young people and their parents. It does so to
illustrate key conceptual themes regarding the manner in which interventions are implemented
and to explore the core characteristics of procedural justice. The quantitative analysis of
outcomes and youth pathways through ASB interventions and criminal justice sanctions are
explored elsewhere (Lewis et al. 2016, under review).
In line with earlier studies (Burney 2009; Crawford and Lister 2007; Cooper et al. 2009;
Clarke et al. 2011), the Nuffield research identified widespread and considerable variations in
ASB policies and the use of interventions and tools. Such variations in practice and process
were not linked directly to the distribution of risks of victimisation, to levels of socioeconomic
deprivation or to disparities in the nature or type of local ASB problems. Rather, they were
influenced more often by local preferences for particular approaches to ASB interventions;
policy selections about the favoured balance between enforcement, prevention and (welfare-
based) support; the nature of interorganisational partnership relations; the willingness of key
individuals to experiment with new tools; and the availability of local support services. For
example, the number of juveniles who received an ASB intervention in relation to population
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size (i.e. per 10,000 population) was more than six times greater in the site with the second-
largest juvenile population than in the site with the most 10- to 17-year-olds. Moreover, there
was no straightforward relationship between levels of deprivation and the number of young
people in receipt of ASB interventions. Rather, resultant policies and practices reflected local
interinstitutional cultures of tolerance, authority and behavioural regulation, informed by
political and organisational choices.
Again, in line with other studies, the research identified a significant gap between formal
statements of local policies and the realities of what local frontline professionals did in practice
(Burney 2009). More generally, the reality of governing ASB in different parts of the country
often significantly belies the rhetorical pronouncements of central government. The research
adds to the abundant evidence that national policies are often resisted and refashioned through
implementation (Solanki et al. 2006; Crawford 2008), as a result of which the expectations of
policymakers are modified, adapted and given distinct concrete form. The research found
evidence of individuals’ and teams’ operating procedures that differed markedly from, and
sometimes were at considerable odds with, those set down in formal policy documents or
articulated by senior managers. Hence, to some considerable degree, policy formation and
implementation become confounded and (con)fused in a more iterative and dynamic process
of delivery than often assumed. As a result, outcomes are less easily predictable.
Most work to tackle ASB occurred before recourse to the use of legal tools like the ASBO,
but this was frequently hampered by a lack of joined-up approaches within and between
partners. Given the nature of ASB and the novelty of many of the regulatory tools, policy
implementation presented significant challenges for local practitioners. Foremost was the
demand for interorganisational partnerships, given the ways in which ASB cuts across the
domains and concerns of divergent organisations. By necessity, these partnerships challenge
organisational assumptions and require that professionals work in different, sometimes inno-
vative, ways (Crawford and Cunningham 2015). They also enable the deployment of diverse
supplementary levers of behavioural control. This is especially evident in the context of social
housing, where civil levers of control associated with tenancy demotion and eviction are often
accompanied by criminal sanctions through the police and courts. The former are often
perceived as more dramatic in their impact by those on the receiving end than the threat of
criminal punishment (Crawford 2013). This highlights the capacity to combine control systems
in a form of Bregulatory pluralism^, whereby complementary instrument mixes are preferred
over single instrument approaches (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998). However, the combi-
nation of regulatory approaches, sanctions and levers of control raises important ethical, legal
and social questions about the interactional effects of different regulatory regimes and the
complementary or ambiguous relations between them. It also prompts concerns about the
implications of regulatory overload, net widening and MESH thinning (Cohen 1985; Brown
2004). There are evident dangers of professionals assuming that multiple instruments—or as
many as possible—should be deployed rather than the minimum necessary to achieve the
desired result.
There were also significant variations in the types and seriousness of behaviours and
activities deemed worthy of intervention. As such, the general thresholds for intervention
were inconsistent, and the types of activities that were typically the focus of attention varied. In
some sites, responses to ASB could be triggered by nuisance behaviour (examples include
kicking footballs at properties, use of abusive language at a street party, throwing snowballs at
members of the public, shouting, swearing, throwing stones, climbing on walls, etc.). In sites
where the thresholds were higher, many behaviours being dealt with through ASB channels
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were criminal in nature (examples include arrested for violent disorder, shoplifting, assaulting
another youth, criminal activities, possession of an offensive weapon—knife—and so forth).
Reflecting these discrepancies, young people’s pathways into, through and away from ASB
interventions differed significantly across the various sites. Some areas drew young people
who already had significant experiences of criminal sanctions and contact with youth justice
into ASB interventions. In one site, many recipients of ASB interventions were already known
to youth justice services. In other areas, by contrast, ASB interventions tended to be more
exclusively used at an early intervention stage to nip in the bud problematic behaviour before it
expressed itself as criminal and prior to the individual experienced significant contact with the
youth justice system. In sum, the findings unsettle prevailing beliefs concerning the targeted
use of ASB interventions to nip crime in the bud by tackling low-level incivilities. Rather, they
evidence the use of ASB interventions with clearly defined criminal behaviour. Furthermore,
they also Bcontest the logical sequencing of behaviour regulation strategies by demonstrating
the haphazard deployment of ASB sanctions within complex webs of prevention, ASB and
youth justice interventions^ (Lewis et al. 2016, under review).
Procedural Matters
There is growing awareness that the impact of criminal justice policies and modes of regulation
are in large part determined by the manner in which they are implemented. Good intentions are
seldom enough and often produce unintended consequences, especially in the field of youth
justice (McCord 2003). Outcomes are shaped by reflexivity, reactance, resistance and feedback
on the part of practitioners charged with implementing interventions, as well as recipients of
regulatory strategies (Pawson and Tilley 1997). The procedural manner in which interventions
are delivered may be as, if not more, important than the mechanisms themselves. Delivery
styles are particularly important in shaping motivations to cooperate and intentions to comply
on behalf of those at the receiving end of interventions. Given the abundant tensions and
blurred lines relating to interventions in response to youth ASB—between civil and criminal
approaches; formal and informal tools; preventive support services and punitive sanctions;
ideals of responsive self-regulation and realities of imposed order—the importance of proce-
dural justice emerged from the research as a pivotal issue.
Procedures matter from at least four different perspectives:
1. They promote better outcomes—a consequentialist view
2. They have inherent value in their own right—a proceduralist view
3. They promote factors other than consequences that individuals value—a
nonconsequential, instrumental view
4. They foster and reinforce wider social norms and moral values—a normative view
There is now a burgeoning literature on the value and application of procedural justice in
criminal matters (Tyler 1990, 2003; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Jackson et al. 2013), notably
with regard to the benefits for compliance and legitimacy (Tyler and Fagan 2008; Crawford
and Hucklesby 2013; Murphy et al. 2015). This approach has been labelled a process-based
model of regulation. Procedural justice entails both justice in the quality of decision making
and in the quality of treatment that people receive. These combine to enhance the legitimacy of
authority and (legal) actors and foster cooperation and compliance with rules. When people are
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so treated, they view law and legal authorities as more legitimate and entitled to be obeyed. As
a result, people become self-regulating, taking personal responsibility for following
social rules. From this perspective it is assumed that legitimate social arrangements that
involve fair procedures, treat people with respect and dignity and provide them with partici-
pation in informed decision-making processes will generate normative commitments to
compliance.
In sum, this literature highlights a number of key relational aspects to just procedures:
First, where people have the opportunity to voice their concerns before an authority
makes a decision
Second, where authorities treat people with dignity and respect
Third, where the motives of authorities are seen to be fair, including whether they act in
the best interest of citizens and display concern for the citizen’s well-being (of particular
relevance in the context of young people and their parents)
Fourth, where decisions made by authorities are based on facts, not biases or personal
opinions (namely, they exhibit neutrality’ and a detached stance)
Adapting insight from the procedural justice literature to civil ASB interventions, we can
identify seven normative characteristics of just procedures: voice; voluntariness; respectful
treatment; parsimony; accuracy of evidence/information; fairness; and neutrality. Let us
explore these themes drawing upon the interview data.
Voice
Voice here refers to the means by which those who are affected or potentially affected by a
decision have the opportunity to contribute to the decision-making process; to articulate their
interests, needs and rights. This presupposes that the individuals understand the processes they
are engaged in as well as their implications. From our interviews, it is clear that not all young
people had an accurate grasp of what they were caught up in, its legal standing or its
implications. As one young person noted: BI remember signing something, but I didn’t know
what it was!^ (YP-C/16)4 In many instances, the claim that young people are given a voice and
choice in informal proceedings and in determining outcomes is something of a sham due to
evident power imbalances in a room full of adults (Wonnacott 1999). The level of participation
or agency in such circumstances is severely restricted or minimal. The reality too frequently is
that choices are presented as varieties of Btake it or leave it^ arrangements, in which young
people are given limited information upon which to base their preferences. The following
young person’s comments illustrates this experience:Bthe conditions were terrible because they
were things like, you can’t be in any more than a group of two, no spitting. Just a load of
ridiculous rules reading down it. There were things that didn’t occur to me whatsoever, I’d
never done these sort of things.^ (YP-B/05)
Even in more genuinely deliberative proceedings in which young people are explicitly
given opportunities and feel free to express themselves unconstrained, there are clear and
present dangers of inappropriately over-burdening young people through interventions that
presuppose the capacity to formulate and articulate preferences, weigh risks, compare
4 All interview quotes are attributed to unique identifiers following the pattern of person type-site/number, where
YP = young person; F = mother, father or carer; and P = professional.
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opportunities and costs, choose from options presented and comply with decisions made.
Exercising voice in deliberative negotiations demands certain attributes and levels of compe-
tency, notably in articulating preferences and communication, which are not available to all
youths. Some young people are evidently better capable of exercising their voice than others.
The use of ASB interventions with young people considerably below the age of criminal
responsibility (which is 10 years in England), further underscores the problems associated with
voice. From the research study, it was not unusual to find children as young as 8 years the
subject of ASB interventions; in some instances the research encountered work, including the
signing of acceptable behaviour contracts, with 7-year-olds. The fact that children this young
are being presented with contracts to sign (when legally they are not entitled to enter formal
contracts), which may have (threatened) implications for the possible eviction of their family
from social housing, raises fundamental question about what is expected of children so young.
For many young people, voice in ASB proceedings constitutes little more than an obstructed
ideal.
Voluntariness
In many senses, the norm of voluntariness is alien to criminal proceedings in which com-
mands, sanctions and punishments are the prevailing regulatory lexicon. Yet in civil,
precriminal interventions (as well as principles of restorative justice, for instance), voluntari-
ness holds a pivotal—some might say sacred—place. Notions of responsive regulation (Ayres
and Braithwaite 1992) that are informed by procedural justice ideals highlight how self-
regulation operates through voluntary cooperation, which entails that regulators recognise
and respond to the conduct of those they seek to regulate in ways that are sensitive to the
capacity of the regulated to regulate themselves and the conditions in which regulation occurs
(Braithwaite 2002). Voluntariness therefore plays a crucial role in the legitimacy of interven-
tions and hence in motivations and compliance. For some, the threats of possible sanctions—
either through the criminal justice system or social housing—were the enduring central
experience of the process. As one young person explained:BThey came to my house and
made me sign this thing and that was when I thought I need to start being good because they’re
going to bring me to jail again. They said if I broke the ABC then I’d get an ASBO and get
brought to court, maybe even get kicked out of my house and I didn’t want that.^ (YP-C/08)
As one mother commented, reflecting the fears experienced by many parents: BI didn’t like
it because they threatened me with my home… it was not very fair because I knew that he’s
not naughty… And they threatened me with my house.^ (F-B/04).
Another mother explained:BWhen the police came round they explained what could happen
if the kids continued [the ASB]. So they said if this happens again then there’s going to be a
report to the council. And you’re going to bring problems on your parents, your parents will
have problems…Wewere aware that if he carried on behaving badly, that there was a potential
risk of losing the house and having to go and live somewhere else.^ (F-D/05).
In this light, it is hard to identify to what extent voluntary cooperation is being enlisted in
the service of self-regulation.
Respectful Treatment
Parents and young people spoke positively of the respectful treatments they received in ways
that conferred legitimacy on the authorities, the process and the decisions arrived at:BWhen
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they came to my house, I thought they were respectful, they knocked on the door and they
spoke appropriately. And I got them to sit down and they explained why they had come to my
house^ (F-C/06).
The research suggested that experienced practitioners emphasised the importance of soft
skills, interpersonal relations and respectful procedures in working with young people and their
parents. Respectful treatment that engaged the young person and parents on a normative level
was more likely to be well received with positive implications for compliance:[The police
community support officer] was like the voice of reason, she was really nice and she spoke to
[the daughter] on her level, she wasn’t rude to her… She explained to [the daughter] about
how it felt like, say, for an old lady or an old man to come into the block and how intimidating
it is to come across a gang of youngsters. And they’ve got to try and walk past the noise on the
landing or on the stairwells^ (F-B/01).
Parsimony
The idea of parsimony is central to notions of responsive regulation and a normative theory of
justice, which seeks to maximise freedom as nondomination (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990);
drawing on civic republicanism as a tradition of political thought that stresses the interconnection
of individual freedom, citizen participation and a rich sense of civic virtue with promotion of the
common good. This approach to ordering at the base of the regulatory pyramid is dependent
upon the credible capacity of escalation—speaking softly and carrying sticks (Braithwaite 1997).
There is a presumption to commence at, and that most regulatory action will occur near, the base
of the pyramid with various attempts to coax compliance through persuasion (through warnings
and informal agreements). From this perspective, only when dialogue and voluntary compliance
fail ought there to be incremental escalation up the pyramid. In practice, this regulatory ladder
was often pushed to one side in search of the right tool for the specific task. As the following
police sergeant explained:BBecause we’ve got this ladder that we have to follow, ASBOs are the
last resort. Complete rubbish in my view. The term last resort causes so many problems if
interpreted in a certain way….ASBOs, like any other form of intervention, should only ever be
used if appropriate. That could be the first intervention, or it could be after a number of other
interventions have been tried, but only when appropriate. Sowe never ever view it as a last resort,
we never view it as a first resort, but when appropriate^ (P-A/12).
The Braithwaitian model of regulation at the base of the regulatory pyramid uncontaminated
by what occurs at the apex in the form of deterrent sanction presents a rather benevolent
interaction between the sticks held as last resort (in the background) and the softly spoken
negotiation in the foreground. Our research suggests that this assumption is misplaced in that,
frequently, the sticks undermine and corrode the quality of the negotiation itself. The complex
realities of treading this thin line between setting realistic parameters and threatening conse-
quences is articulated by the following front-line ASB worker from the local authority:Whilst not
wanting to frighten the young person, we’re also very realistic very early in our conversations with
the parent….However, because you are a tenant, and you have certain tenancy conditions that
you’ve agreed to abide by, this is how your child’s action could affect your tenancy. So we don’t
want to spread doom and gloom right from the beginning, but we’re also very realistic^ (P-D/05).
However, this was experienced, interpreted and felt very often by young people and their
parents very differently to what may have been intended by the ASB practitioners. As Bottoms
sagely notes: BThose who seek to induce compliance in others very often think they know
what it will be like to be on the receiving end of the measures that they administer. But…
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people in power frequently misjudge their audiences^ (2001: 99). In the context of accusations
about ASB, the presence of coercive sticks, however, even whether these are held in the
background or as a last resort, frequently undermine any sense of voluntariness or uncon-
strained choice, as the following young person testified:
BShe [police officer] took me into the office with my mum, asked me to sign it. I said:
Oh I want to read it and everything! She let me read it but she says to me I didn’t have to
sign it. But if I didn’t sign it, I could have got into more trouble for not signing it…so I
signed it.^ (YP-B/01)
This highlights limitations of the Braithwaitian view of the noncorrosive nature of punish-
ment at the apex of regulatory regimes. The reality often is that the very presence of carrying
sticks can undermine the normative values of the softly spoken words.
The principles of parsimony and proportionality demand a mature and robust understanding
of the appropriateness of thresholds of intervention with young people. As one Youth
Offending Service manager commented whilst reflecting on the reasons for a decline in the
use of ASBOs and ABCs in the area:BThat would indicate to us two things. One is that there
were more young people being effectively diverted, secondly that maybe there’s more maturity
about; where is the threshold? And there has to be a threshold about what is boisterous
behaviour, what is kids being kids, what needs sanction and what doesn’t? I think there is
probably a greater understanding of that^ (P-C/09).
There is a central paradox in the context of shrinkingwelfare budgets and uneven availability
of support services. For some families (mothers in particular), ASB interventions were wel-
comed precisely because of the possibility that they might open up access to local services that
might not otherwise have been available, notably with regard to family support. For families in
difficulty, some assistance was patently preferable to none, even if this came at expense of
stigmatisation and possible criminalisation. Where access to support services is conditional
upon behavioural change, parsimony takes on a different meaning and interpretation.
Accuracy of Evidence and Information
Given the informality, lack of due process and pressures for early intervention and prompt
responses to incidents of youth ASB, many cases involved a weak evidence base both in
relation to: (i) understanding the details of an incident, which often relied upon hearsay and
public perceptions; and (ii) understanding the young people and their families (notably with
regard to other matters regarding the family and other interventions by differing services,
which were poorly linked and for which data were frequently absent). With regard to the
former, a local authority-employed ASB worker explained:
The weakness is that when we actually get to the signing of the document, this is the
document, this is saying: Bso and so will not involve themselves in these activities^.
There’s always a lack of evidence. So the police are saying: BWell yeah, he’s up to no
good, we know this one and he’s a bad egg!^ Housing are saying: BYeah, he’s a wrong
one^ and so on. But when you actually get the parent down there and say: BThis is what
your son’s been up to^, often we get this sort of thing: BWell prove it. I’m not signing
anything until you can prove it^ (P-A/03).
This weak evidence base resulted in parents and young people challenging the legitimacy
and fairness of subsequent proceedings, as the following exchange testifies:
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Father: Well he’s meant to have gone down one of the streets on the estate and thrown
snowballs at a house.
Mother: That was supposed to have bricks in the snowballs weren’t they?
Father: Meant to be stones in the snowballs but which is ridiculous anyway because his
sister was with him and she said there were no stones in snowballs. It was just kids
playing, throwing snowballs. When I went to the housing, I actually said to them:
BYou’re telling me you’ve never thrown snowballs?^ And he said: BI understand that,
yes^.
Mother: He was supposed to have been videoed; well we asked to see this video.
Father: They didn’t have it, but [the son] put his hands up to throwing snowballs, he
says: Bbut I haven’t thrown any bricks^ (F-C/01).
The importance of accurate information about the youths and their families is also crucial
for reasons of effectiveness in terms of their ability to use and draw upon their own resources
for the purposes of compliance. Fostering the capacity for self-regulation and enlisting the
capabilities and resources of family and community members can be vitally important but
relies upon knowledgeable and informed practitioners. One mother explained the positive role
that family, friends and neighbours can exert in fostering compliance:
It was a positive thing… And he did listen and he did understand it and I think if you’ve
got a parent behind you that is saying: BNo, these people are right you know!^ All the
people on my road, we were all in unison with it, we all supported each other. Because
we’ve all grown up here together and we’ve all got children here now so we support
each other and say: BNo, it’s not fair on [a neighbour], don’t stand on her doorstep or
outside her house^. So [the son]’s friends were getting it from their parents, too. So it did
work out and we’re all [social housing] tenants so we were all concerned about our
tenancies^ (F-C/02).
By contrast, ASB interventions can also hinder (whether intentionally or not) the capacity
and willingness of parents and significant others to foster desistance and promote prevention.
Most specifically, where not complemented by access to supportive services, overly punitive
approaches can foster disengagement and undermine the capacity of young people and
families to nurture the conditions necessary to secure long-term compliance.
Fairness
Some young people and parents were concerned about the fairness of the procedures applied in
their case. For example, one father was angered by the fact that he had not been present when
his son had signed the ABC, albeit the mother was present: BLike with the ABC, I don’t think
really they should have been there without me being there, and I could have signed the
paperwork. It’s like I know a lot of the criminal side of it—I was a bad bugger when I was
younger so...but to tell somebody they’ve got to sign a piece of paper and not read it, to me
that’s wrong^ (F-A/01).
As well as consistency of treatment and fairness of procedures, concerns about fairness also
related to issues of proportionality and wider conceptions of the appropriateness of interven-
tions. The mother of a girl who was involved in the same snowballing incident (discussed
above) expressed similar concerns about the lack of proportionality in this case:BWell—I can
understand people being evicted for bad anti-social behaviour… But for one snowball being
BIt ain’t (just) what you do, it’s (also) the way that you do... 21
chucked! Fair enough, one snowball can lead to two snowballs and stones and everything else,
but [the daughter]’s never been in trouble with the law before and there’s people on this estate
that’s in trouble with the law but they’re still living in their [social] houses. So I thought that
was a bit harsh; eviction for the next time^ (F-C/03).
The father quoted earlier whose son was involved in the snowballing incident reinforced this
perception of unfairness:BHe was just knocking around with his mates having a laugh as far as he
were concerned.Well as far as he was concerned, it was just snowballs, he says everybody’s done
it, not as if I’m going round smashing windows or breaking into buildings… I thought it was
stupid, it’s what every kid’s done, thrown a snowball, you even see grown-ups doing it. I thought it
was actually stupid at the time. I thought it was actually the City Council going too far^ (F-C/01).
Many young people, for instance, felt that the very definition of ASB—given its capacious,
subjective and all-encompassing quality (dependent on the perceptions of others)—was itself
unfair, as the following young person illustrates: BYou could easily alarm someone couldn’t
you? You could smoke or stand with a cigarette outside someone’s house and they might think
it’s a spliff and that’s alarming isn’t it? I don’t find that fair to be honest!^ (YP-C/10).
Neutrality
Neutrality speaks to the legitimacy of the decision makers and figures of authority; that they
are nonpartisan and exhibit impartiality. This demands a detached stance as a central value.
From the perspective of parents and young people, this translates into experiences that are not
driven by the organisational priorities or ideologies of particular professions but rather treat
them as people whose interests and well-being are of concern. It also expressed itself in terms
of the transparency and reviewability of the decisions made and as such could be challenged or
reviewed and was therefore justifiable, as the following local-authority worker
explained: BThey might think well let’s put all ten on an ABC because it’s an area that’s
always got problems. They’re local kids that know better, let’s just go straight to an ABC. So
sometimes we’ll bypass the powers but we have to justify it because obviously I don’t want
complaints flying in say from parents to my complaints department asking why we’ve done it.
So we’ve always got to justify it^ (P-D/07).
Distributive Justice
The preceding discussions highlight the importance of the normative and affective dimensions of
decision-making experiences in the exercise of authority. They also reinforce the current failings
of practice in the delivery of ASB interventions that fail to live up to the regulatory ideals of
procedural justice. For young people, ABCs and other ASB interventions were most effective
when they were issued in a fair and proportionate way in which the young person and parents felt
listened to and respected. This theme was evident across the four sites. Experiences of Brespectful^
and Bappropriate^ treatment shaped the willingness to cooperate, notably among parents. One
parent summarised two different experiences of procedures and her responses to them:
The first time of going to the housing, we didn’t sign the ABC order because I just
thought no it’s not fair because it was only sent to my son and not to the other children
on the road…So we didn’t sign that one…But she came to visit us at home–it was a
couple of police officers and somebody from our housing association—and they talked
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me through it and I thought: BDo you know what, it’s best just to sign this one^. And to
show that we are willing—because [her son] wasn’t really naughty. So we did, we
signed that one…We just weren’t signing it [the first time] because we didn’t think it
was fair…but the second time they were very nice to us when they came to the house,
really, really nice (F-B/02).
Yet, this experience also raises implicit questions about the limitations of a purely process-
based approach. It largely ignores the interaction between procedural and distributive justice.
Legitimacy lies not just in procedure but also the fairness of social arrangements and authority
more generally. Whilst procedural justice is necessary to foster compliance, it is not sufficient;
social outcomes matter, not just (or simply) procedures.
Of most concern to questions of distributive justice is that the experience of justice and the
powers of intervention are clearly different with regard to the housing tenure and status of the
family concerned. Many ASB tools are either tenure specific or seen as more effective in
relation to those in social housing, given the impact of the sanctions—notably eviction—that
they enable. As a consequence, in England, those living in social housing are the subject of
differential justice in ways that mere improvements in procedure will effect little change. The
problems of Bjustice by tenure^ and the questions of (il)legitimacy to which they give rise are
not resolved simply by fair procedures. They are problems of distributive outcomes. Hence, to
paraphrase the paper’s title: BIt aint just the way that you do it! It’s also what you do^ and the
distributive consequences that arise!
Conclusions
The research presented here demonstrates that among practitioners there was an evident prefer-
ence for working preventatively with young people and parents, providing support alongside
clear boundaries that specify possible sanctions for breach. However, there were significant
inconsistencies over the implementation of, and commitment to, a tiered approach to ASB tools
or ladder of interventions. This can contribute to young people climbing, or being escalated, up
the ladder at different speeds in different areas. In this regard, the importance of parsimony as a
key normative principle guiding practice is underscored by two further central findings from the
research: first, the inclination among risk-averse practitioners to deploymultiple levers of control;
and second, concerns about differential experiences of Bjustice by tenure^. This suggests the need
to emphasise parsimony over precaution: the least possible intervention necessary for the
attainment of the preventative goals rather than a shotgun approach that overburdens young
people with multiple strategies of regulation in the hope that some of it might bear fruit. More
generally, research shows that the predictive capacity of practitioners to intervene with young
people destined to proceed to more serious criminality remains highly circumspect. The available
evidence suggests significant flows into, and away from, at-risk groups over the life course. In the
context of early intervention, there is considerable scope for false positives and false negatives
amongst cohorts of young people. Hence, there are genuine ethical concerns about labelling
young people as future delinquents under the auspices of ASB intervention and the services that
they access, given the conditionality that attends to them.
What is particularly worrying—given the findings reported here—is the fact that under the
benevolent cloak of preventing future offending, young people are becoming the subject of
earlier and more intensive interventions and closer scrutiny, which risks propelling them faster
into possible criminalisation. Research reminds us that greater contact with legal authorities
can often serve to undermine desistance, prolong persistence and draw young people deeper
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into offending (McAra and McVie 2007). This implies that due concern should be given to the
proportionality of the response in terms of the behaviour itself rather than an overriding
concern for what might happen in the future. Otherwise, there are real dangers that overly
punitive early interventions may serve to attribute and affix Btroublemaker^ identities and
reputations on young people, which become difficult to shed in transitions to adulthood.
Subjecting certain young people at an early age to more intense surveillance and monitoring
on the part of formal authorities may set them up to fail by rendering minor infractions more
likely to be noticed and by drawing them more precipitously and deeper into processes of
criminalisation.
A key challenge, therefore, is to design, develop and promote constructive forms of early
intervention and prevention that support and work with—rather than against—genuinely
informal (familial and communal) process of regulation and social control that foster cooper-
ation, compliance and desistance whilst avoiding stigmatisation, unnecessary coercion and
criminalisation. Despite the changes to the legislative framework heralded by the 2014 Act,
challenges in delivering ASB interventions with young people in ways that conform to ideals
of Bresponsive regulation^ persist and are as pressing as ever. Given that ASB interventions
occupy simultaneously the gateway into and possible diversionary routes away from youth
justice, as well as providing access to crucial support services for individuals and families in
difficulty, it is vital that the use of those interventions is informed by clear normative principles
of procedural and distributive justice. Compliance and cooperation demand processes that are
perceived as legitimate and are experienced as procedurally just. For many young people ASB
interventions are not an early intervention sitting below the criminal justice system but, rather,
supplement or provide alternatives to youth justice. This research suggests that despite well-
intentioned ambitions and aspirations held by many practitioners, the resultant practices
frequently fail to conform to characteristics of procedural justice in ways that might enhance
capacities and capabilities within communities, families and individuals for self-regulation. To
do so, we need to know more about, and be sensitive to, the ways in which regulatory powers
are experienced, interpreted and felt by those groups in the population on the receiving end of
measures designed to regulate behaviour.
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